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ABSTRACT 
NATALIE MINTON: Cognitive Biases and Reflexive Control 
(Under the direction of Dr. David W. Bath) 
 
Manipulating an opponent is nothing new to warfare, but what is new is the 
understanding behind modern tactics, psychology, and the how the two intertwine under 
real world circumstances. One modern tactic, particularly used by the Russian 
government, is called reflexive control. This hybrid warfare tactic is used to manipulate 
an opponent into unknowingly making decisions benefiting the manipulator while 
harming the opponent. Though executed through many outlets, reflexive control is aimed 
at flaws within the opponent’s decision making process. Many such flaws are categorized 
as cognitive biases derived from mental shortcuts that can lead the brain to misjudge 
information.  
This paper begins research on the question: do cognitive biases make the United 
States vulnerable to Russia’s use of reflexive control? To answer this question, it must be 
determined if there is a correlation between cognitive biases and vulnerability to reflexive 
control. Finding this correlation could possibly provide a greater understanding of 
modern-day Russian reflexive control, and a narrower understanding of what makes the 
United States vulnerable to Russian hybrid warfare.  
To make this determination, this paper analyzes Cold War and modern literature 
on reflexive control, analyzes literature on cognitive biases, and studies U.S.-Russian 
relations and Western-Russian relations from the Cold War to 2017. After examining 
Western literature and instances of reflexive control, this paper determines that cognitive 
	   iv	  
biases play a role in Western countries’ foreign policy. Though foreign policy decisions 
rely on policymakers, this paper looks at how analysts, specifically intelligence analysts, 
can better understand the relationship between cognitive biases and reflexive control in 
order to better inform policymakers. 
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Introduction 
Manipulating an opponent is nothing new to warfare, but what is new is the 
understanding behind modern tactics, psychology, and the how the two intertwine under 
real world circumstances. One modern tactic, particularly used by the Russian 
government, is called reflexive control. This hybrid warfare tactic is used to manipulate 
an opponent into unknowingly making decisions benefiting the manipulator while 
harming the opponent. Though executed through various outlets, reflexive control is 
aimed at exploiting flaws within the opponent’s decision making process. Many such 
flaws are categorized as cognitive biases, otherwise known as mental shortcuts that can 
lead the brain to misjudge information. 
This paper begins research on the question: do cognitive biases make the United 
States vulnerable to Russia’s use of reflexive control? Answering this question could 
possibly provide a greater understanding of modern-day Russian reflexive control, and a 
narrower understanding of what makes the United States vulnerable to Russian hybrid 
warfare. Very few pieces of academic literature connect both cognitive biases and 
reflexive control. This paper’s research is relevant because reflexive control targets flaws 
in the opponent’s decision-making process, and cognitive biases are essentially flaws 
within the decision-making process. Providing an answer to the research question will 
determine if there is a correlation between cognitive biases and vulnerability to reflexive 
control.
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In order to make this determination, this paper will analyze Cold War era and 
modern literature on reflexive control, analyze literature on cognitive biases, and study 
U.S.-Russian relations and Western-Russian relations from the Cold War to 2016. After 
observing specific historical instances of reflexive control, it will be determined based on 
the U.S. or West’s reactions if cognitive biases seem to have played a role.  
Part I begins with a full explanation about reflexive control as a warfare tactic, 
how Russia has modified it for today’s world, and how it targets cognitive flaws. Part II 
introduces cognitive biases, provides explanations on recognizing biases, and places them 
into categories dealing with information processing while comparing the human mind to 
the job of an intelligence analyst. In Part III, instances in U.S-Russian relations and 
Western-Russian relations are studied. Specifically observed are Russia’s use of reflexive 
control, U.S.-Western reactions to reflexive control, and the instances’ outcomes to 
determine whether cognitive biases were present in U.S.-Western decision making. 
Though foreign policy decisions, like those observed in Part III, rely on policymakers, 
this paper looks at how analysts, specifically intelligence analysts, can better understand 
the relationship between cognitive biases and reflexive control in order to better inform 
policymakers. 
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Part I: Russian Reflexive Control 
In the past decade, particularly since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, 
international interest in Russian hybrid warfare has been on the rise.1 At first, this new 
wave of Russian hybrid warfare was treated as something new; but now analysts are 
beginning to see its resemblance to Soviet disinformation tactics, specifically reflexive 
control. 
Russia has pulled the reflexive control doctrine from the Soviet days and plugged 
it into their present day operations.2 Reflexive control is a technique designed to target 
errors within the opponent’s decision-making process in order to provoke a reaction 
benefiting Russia at the expense of the opponent. Reflexive control does not seek to 
destroy the enemy’s psyche, but to control it by forming the enemy’s perception in line 
with Soviet interests.3 Though reflexive control does not appear in Soviet literature until 
the 1970s, the Soviet Union has produced experts in reflexive control theory at least since 
the 1960s.4
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Jon White, “Dismiss, Distort, Distract, and Dismay: Continuity and Change in Russian 
Disinformation,” (Policy Brief, Institute for European Studies, 2016), 
http://www.ies.be/node/3689.	  
2	  Maria Snegovaya, “Putin’s Information Warfare in Ukraine: Soviet Origins of Russia’s 
Hybrid Warfare,” (Russia Report 1, Institute for the Study of War, 2015), 
http://understandingwar.org/report/putins-information-warfare-ukraine-soviet-origins-
russias-hybrid-warfare. 
3	  A.V. Bedritsky, “Realization of the Concepts of Information Warfare by the Military 
Political Leadership of the USA during the Modern Era,” RISI, 2007. 
4	  Timothy L. Thomas, “Russia’s Reflexive Control: Theory and the Military,” Journal of 
Slavic Military Studies 17 (2004), 237–256, https://www.rit.edu/~w-
cmmc/literature/Thomas_2004.pdf.	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The Soviet Union used reflexive control on the operational, tactical, and strategic 
levels regarding internal and external politics.5 Russia has changed many aspects of 
reflexive control to fit today’s world, but most of their techniques fundamentally mimic 
that of the Soviets.6 The key element that has remained is Soviet disinformation. 
Reflexive control is the practice and theory of controlling one’s opponent by causing 
them to act as a “reflex” to disinformation or deception. When using reflexive control, 
one conveys specially designed information, or disinformation, to provoke a reaction
leading the opponent to voluntarily make the predetermined decision the initiator 
desires.7 
Disinformation can be divided into two categories: offensive and defensive.8 
Offensive disinformation seeks to influence decision-makers and public opinion abroad, 
while defensive disinformation aims to influence Soviet/Russian citizens.9 An easier way 
to frame this is by connecting offensive with external politics, and defensive with internal 
politics.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Timothy L. Thomas, “Russia’s Reflexive Control: Theory and the Military,” Journal of 
Slavic Military Studies 17 (2004), 237–256, https://www.rit.edu/~w-
cmmc/literature/Thomas_2004.pdf. 
6	  Jon White, “Dismiss, Distort, Distract, and Dismay: Continuity and Change in Russian 
Disinformation,” (Policy Brief, Institute for European Studies, 2016), 
http://www.ies.be/node/3689.	  
7	  Timothy L. Thomas, “Russia’s Reflexive Control: Theory and the Military,” Journal of 
Slavic Military Studies 17 (2004), 237–256, https://www.rit.edu/~w-
cmmc/literature/Thomas_2004.pdf.	  
8	  Jon White, “Dismiss, Distort, Distract, and Dismay: Continuity and Change in Russian 
Disinformation,” (Policy Brief, Institute for European Studies, 2016), 
http://www.ies.be/node/3689.	  
9	  Ibid.	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Some ways in which Russian reflexive control mimics that of the Soviet Union 
include establishing foreign-language news outlets and Russian-sympathizing think tanks 
in the West. These are two disinformation tactics that began in the Soviet Era.10 For 
example, Russia Today (RT) is a multilingual, Russian government-funded news site 
known for spreading disinformation and propaganda using Russian perspective on global 
events. Popular Russian blogger, Anton Nosik, refers to RT as a “Soviet-style propaganda 
campaign dating as far back as Joseph Stalin.”11 This is only one example. 
Disinformation is used to pressure and disorient the adversary politically, 
economically, and psychologically by “intensifying diplomatic pressure and propaganda 
to the world community.”12 Reflexive control disinformation methods include: supporting 
the target states’ internal opposition, spreading dissatisfaction among target states’ 
population, molding domestic and international public opinion, deploying covert 
operations in the form of cyber attacks, etc.13 To understand how Russia uses 
disinformation, it is important to note the Soviet Union’s disinformation doctrine. 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Anton Troianovski, “Russia Ramps Up Information War in Europe,” Wall Street 
Journal, August 21, 2014, www.wsj.com/articles/russia-ramps-up-information-war-in-
europe-1408675046.	  	  
11	  “New Global TV Venture to Promote Russia,” VOA News, July 6, 2005, 
http://www.voanews.com/a/a-13-2005-07-06-voa33-66930727/377326.html.	  	  
12	  Timothy Thomas, “Think Like A Russian Officer: Basic Factors And Contemporary 
Thinking On The Nature Of War,” The Foreign Military Studies Office, April 2016, 
http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Thinking%20Like%20A%20Russian%20O
fficer_monograph_Thomas%20(final).pdf.  
13	  Ibid.	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Reflexive Control in a New Era  
Soviet reflexive control included specific strategies for internal and external 
politics. Influencing internal politics meant using defensive disinformation, while 
external politics meant using offensive disinformation. Defensive disinformation includes 
distorting the truth or creating an entirely new reality in the domestic media.14 In the 
Soviet Union, the government propagandized their citizenry through Soviet media and 
attempted to block all outside voices, like Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.15 Russia 
uses these same techniques today, but with 21st century alterations.  
Because the world’s primary information source has moved from radio to the 
Internet, Russia blocks internet protocol addresses instead of foreign radio broadcasts.16 
Aside from the Internet, Russian citizens get their daily news from television.17 As a way 
to ensure defensive disinformation, the Russian government has banned all foreign 
ownership of media outlets in Russia.18 As a result, the Russian government owns most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Peter Pomerantsev, “Russia and the Menace of Unreality,” The Atlantic, September 9, 
2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/09/russia-putin-rev-
olutionizing-information-warfare/379880/; Paul Goble, “Soviets Only Censored Reality; 
Putin Creates an Alternative One, Ikhlov Says,” Window on Eurasia, 15 August 2015, 
http://win- dowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/08/soviets-only-censored-reality-
putin.html.   
15	  Philip Shenon, “Years of Jamming Voice of America Halted by Soviet,” New York 
Times, May 26, 1987; Serge Schmemann, “Soviet Union Ends Years of Jamming of 
Radio Liberty,” New York Times, December 1, 1988.  
16	  Paul Goble, “Moscow Now Seeking to Ban Means Russians Use to Get Around Its 
Blocking of Web Sites,” Window on Eurasia, August 1, 2015, http://windowoneurasia2. 
blogspot.com/2015/08/moscow-now-seeking-to-ban-means.html.  
17	  Paul Goble, “Despite Internet, Moscow TV Sets Agenda for Russians, Levada Center 
Says,” The Interpreter, June 23, 2014.  
18	  Paul Goble, “Russia May Soon Have ‘More Blocked Websites than Working Ones,’ 
Legal Expert Says,” The Interpreter, April 11, 2015, 
http://www.interpretermag.com/russia-may-soon-have-more-blocked-websites-than-
working-ones-legal-expert-says/.  
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Russian media, and has a majority percent interest in outlets it does not own.19 Though 
this disinformation is focused internally, it has external effects that play into offensive 
disinformation.  
Russian heritage citizens living in former Soviet Union states, apart from Russia, 
get their news from Russian-language news outlets.20 This means that Russian defensive 
disinformation has a larger audience outside their domestic population. Because the 
Russian narrative is circulated into former Soviet states that are now young democracies, 
Russian defensive disinformation attracts Western attention.21 However, unlike the Soviet 
Union, Russia does not seek to convince the West of their narratives. Instead, Russia 
seeks to pollute the news cycle, particularly the Internet, with disinformation.22 Russia’s 
goals are convincing the public that the Internet is an unreliable news source and 
discrediting the media in Western eyes.23 Here, defensive disinformation turns offensive. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  “Russia Profile – Media,” BBC, February 25, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-17840134; Roxburgh, Angus, The Strongman: Vladimir Putin and the Struggle 
for Russia, I. B. Tauris, New York: 2012, Print, Pg. 56-63, 292. 
20	  Jon White, “Dismiss, Distort, Distract, and Dismay: Continuity and Change in Russian 
Disinformation,” (Policy Brief, Institute for European Studies, 2016), 
http://www.ies.be/node/3689.	  
21	  “State-Run News Station Accused of Making Up Child Crucifixion,” Moscow Times, 
July 14, 2014,	  http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/state-run-news-station- 
accused-of-making-up-child-crucifixion/503397.html.; Pomerantsev, Peter. “Russia and 
the Menace of Unreality How Vladimir Putin is Revolutionizing Information Warfare,” 
The Atlantic, September 9, 2014.  
22	  Daisy Sindelar, “The Kremlin’s Troll Army: Moscow Is Financing Legions of Pro-
Russia Internet Commenters. But How Much Do They Matter?” The Atlantic, August 12, 
2014 http://wwwtheatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/the-kremlins- troll-
army/375932/.  
23	  Jon White, “Dismiss, Distort, Distract, and Dismay: Continuity and Change in Russian 
Disinformation,” (Policy Brief, Institute for European Studies, 2016), 
http://www.ies.be/node/3689.	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Offensive disinformation is the main concern for the international community. To 
carry out offensive disinformation for reflexive control, Russia uses what contemporary 
analysts call “the 4D Approach” – dismiss, distort, distract, and dismay.24 When 
information arises revealing Russian interests, Russian leaders publicly dismiss it.25 For 
instance, Putin dismissed international accusations that Russian military forces were 
occupying Crimea.26  Russian spokesmen distort the contrary information that persists 
after dismissal.27 Pro-Kremlin journalists distorted facts about Ukrainians.28 If the same 
contrary information persists even after distortion, Russia will distract international 
attention away from Russian interests.29 Russian media distracted the international 
community, for example, with outrageous theories about Malaysian Airlines Flight 17.30 
At the last resort, Russian officials will dismay the international audience with a public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  John B. Emerson, “Exposing Russian Disinformation,” June 29, 2015, 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/exposing-russian-disinformation.  
25	  Jon White, “Dismiss, Distort, Distract, and Dismay: Continuity and Change in Russian 
Disinformation,” (Policy Brief, Institute for European Studies, 2016), 
http://www.ies.be/node/3689. 
26	  John B. Emerson, “Exposing Russian Disinformation,” June 29, 2015, 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/exposing-russian-disinformation. 
27	  Jon White, “Dismiss, Distort, Distract, and Dismay: Continuity and Change in Russian 
Disinformation,” (Policy Brief, Institute for European Studies, 2016), 
http://www.ies.be/node/3689.	  
28	  Maria Snegovaya, “Putin’s Information Warfare in Ukraine: Soviet Origins of Russia’s 
Hybrid Warfare,” (Russia Report 1, Institute for the Study of War, September 2015), 
http://understandingwar.org/report/putins-information-warfare-ukraine-soviet-origins-
russias-hybrid-warfare.  
29	  Jon White, “Dismiss, Distort, Distract, and Dismay: Continuity and Change in Russian 
Disinformation,” (Policy Brief, Institute for European Studies, 2016), 
http://www.ies.be/node/3689.	  
30	  John B. Emerson, “Exposing Russian Disinformation,” June 29, 2015, 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/exposing-russian-disinformation.	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statement or action drastically contrasting the common idea about Russian interests.31 
The Russian officials “dismayed” the international community by increasing nuclear 
rhetoric and threats against NATO, one case in particular involving Russian ambassador 
to Denmark threatening to aim nuclear missiles at Danish warships in response to 
Denmark joining NATO’s missile defense system.32 
Russia uses the Soviet-designed 4D Approach, but seems to have added two more 
Ds to the process. These additions are destroy and destabilize. Russia’s disinformation 
campaign seeks to destroy pieces of their enemy’s infrastructure.33 For instance, Russia 
uses cyber-attacks to cause power-supply facility failure, transportation paralysis, etc.34 
These attacks are later used for the greater purpose of destabilization. In February 2007, 
Russian President Vladimir Putin asserted in his Munich Speech that the U.S.-led 
unipolar international system is “unacceptable”, and Russia would pursue its own 
geopolitical interests despite the hegemonic power balance.35 These geopolitical interests 
include expanding its territory to consolidate post-Soviet states.36 To achieve this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  Jon White, “Dismiss, Distort, Distract, and Dismay: Continuity and Change in Russian 
Disinformation,” (Policy Brief, Institute for European Studies, 2016), 
http://www.ies.be/node/3689.	  
32	  John B. Emerson, “Exposing Russian Disinformation,” June 29, 2015, 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/exposing-russian-disinformation.	  
33	  A.V. Bedritsky, “Realization of the Concepts of Information Warfare by the Military 
Political Leadership of the USA during the Modern Era,” RISI, 2007.	  
34	  Maria Snegovaya, “Putin’s Information Warfare in Ukraine: Soviet Origins of Russia’s 
Hybrid Warfare,” (Russia Report 1, Institute for the Study of War, 2015), 
http://understandingwar.org/report/putins-information-warfare-ukraine-soviet-origins-
russias-hybrid-warfare.	  
35	  “Putin’s Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy,” The 
Washington Post, February 12, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html.  
36	  Alexandra Wiktorek Sarlo, “Russian Foreign Policy in the Putin Era: A Conference 
Report,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 18, 2016, 
http://www.fpri.org/article/2016/05/russian-foreign-policy-putin-era/.	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objective, Russia uses disinformation to destabilize regions, as it has attempted in 
Ukraine and Estonia.37 Major General N. I. Turko, Russian Federation General Staff 
Academy instructor, proposed in 1996 that using reflexive control by attacking a state’s 
information resources could inflict destabilizing damage to the geopolitical power 
balance.38 Currently, Russia seems to combine destruction and destabilization 
disinformation techniques to gradually change the international system’s geopolitical 
power balance. 
 
Reflexive Control and Cognitive Error 
Because reflexive control can impact a state from its military and government 
systems down to its population’s opinions, lacking properly reinforced information 
security can lead a state to losing its sovereignty, economic, and global power status.39 
Within information security are information resources. Timothy Thomas defines 
information resources as a group of four characteristics: “… 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  Alexandra Wiktorek Sarlo, “Russian Foreign Policy in the Putin Era: A Conference 
Report,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 18, 2016, 
http://www.fpri.org/article/2016/05/russian-foreign-policy-putin-era/. 
38	  N. I. Turko and S. A. Modestov, “Refleksivnoe upravlenie razvitiem strate- gicheskikh 
sil gosudarstva kak mekhanizm sovremennoi geopolitiki (Reflexive Control in the 
Development of Strategic Forces of States as a Mechanism of Geopolitics),” report at the 
conference on “Systems Analysis on the Threshold of the 21st Century: Theory and 
Practice,” Moscow, February 1996, p. 366.  
39	  S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “The Strategy of the Indirect Approach: Its 
Impact on Modern Warfare,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 6, 2011, Pg. 6-9. 
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1.   information and transmitters of information, to include the method or technology 
of obtaining, conveying, gathering, accumulating, processing, storing, and 
exploiting information;  
2.   infrastructure, including information centers means for automating information 
processes, switchboard communications, and data transfer networks;  
3.   programming and mathematical means for managing information;  
4.   and administrative and organizational bodies that manage information processes, 
scientific personnel, creators of data bases and knowledge, as well as personnel 
who service the means of informatizatsiya [informatization].” 40 
 
By targeting these characteristics, Russia is able to influence their target to form a 
decision based on disinformation. Disinformation is fabricated according to Russia’s 
understanding of the enemy’s intelligence, concepts, knowledge, ideas, and experience.41 
This combination of qualities is considered the foundation of the decision-maker’s 
information filter.42 The information filter is the cognitive tool the brain uses to decide 
what information is useful and what is not.43 Reflexive control’s primary use is to find 
and exploit the information filter’s weakest link – cognitive error.44  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  Timothy L. Thomas, “Russia’s Reflexive Control: Theory and the Military,” Journal of 
Slavic Military Studies 17 (2004), 237–256, https://www.rit.edu/~w-
cmmc/literature/Thomas_2004.pdf.	  
41 S. Leonenko, ‘Refleksivnoe upravlenie protivnikom [Reflexive control of the enemy],’ 
Armeiskii sbornik (Army Collection), No. 8, 1995, p. 28-30.  
42	  Ibid.  
43	  Ibid. 
44	  Timothy L. Thomas, “Russia’s Reflexive Control: Theory and the Military,” Journal of 
Slavic Military Studies 17 (2004), 237–256, https://www.rit.edu/~w-
cmmc/literature/Thomas_2004.pdf.	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According to Daniel Kahneman, the brain’s information processing is separated 
into two parts: System 1 and System 2. System 1 operates involuntarily leaving thought 
to intuition and automatic, effortless decision making. System 1 reacts to new 
information that can be easily assessed via heuristics and cognitive bias45 making these 
judgments more prone to error. System 2 responds to information that requires the brain 
to concentrate and use more effortful thinking to make decisions.46 Reflexive control can 
exploit this system difference by making the desired behavior effortless, therefore easier 
to process and more prone to cognitive error. 
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Part II: Cognitive Biases and Intelligence Analysts 
The word “bias” is used with negative connotation, commonly associated with 
being stubborn or being wrong. Even Merriam-Webster holds this impression defining a 
“bias” as “a tendency to believe that some people, ideas, etc., are better than others that 
usually results in treating some people unfairly.”47 Though this is a correct definition for 
a social bias, a cognitive bias is somewhat different.  
The human mind has fundamental limitations, which include cognitive limitations 
that effect decision-making.48 Cognitive biases stem from heuristics which are essentially 
mental shortcuts the brain uses to make quick judgments about new information without 
using conscious mental activity.49 A cognitive bias is established within the subconscious 
to get around these limitations and create simplifying strategies to make information 
processing easier.50 Simply put, cognitive biases are basic rules of thumb the brain uses to 
make sense of a complex situation under a short time constraint.51 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  Merriam-Webster, October 14, 2016,	  http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/bias.   
48	  Richards J. Heuer, Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, Central Intelligence 
Agency: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999, Print, Pg. 111, www.odci.gov/csi. 
49	  Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases,” Science, vol. 185, 1974.  
50	  Richards J. Heuer, Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, Central Intelligence 
Agency: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999, Print, Pg. 111, www.odci.gov/csi.	  
51	  Ibid.	  
	   14	  
Most of the time, people believe they know what is going on in their minds – a 
conscious sequence of thoughts.52 But that is not exactly how the mind works. If a person 
is asked what they are thinking, the person can produce an answer; but most of what 
comes to the conscious mind arises from the subconscious (meaning they are unaware of 
their original thought’s origin).53 For example, one can believe in an instant that someone 
is irritated by the expression on their face and the tone of their voice, but one is unaware 
of how they came to know at that instant that this expression and tone means irritation.  
Unlike Merriam-Webster’s definition, it is important to note that cognitive biases 
are not rooted in emotional or intellectual judgments.54 Instead, they are subconscious 
shortcuts that are consistent, predictable, but most importantly – a systematic error.55 The 
term “error” does not mean that these biases are always wrong. The human mind bases 
most of its decisions off of these kinds of judgments, and most of the time these 
judgments are appropriate and justified.56 However, because these judgments guide 
people through life, people often fail to see the times when their judgments have 
misguided them.57 Biases are deemed “errors” in decision-making because they are 
essentially mental shortcuts that are not fault-proof. When the subconscious mind uses
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, New York: 
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cognitive biases, the outcome of them leading the conscious mind right or wrong relies 
on chance.58  
Though cognitive biases are consistent and predictable, they are invariably 
difficult to spot. As former CIA officer, Richards J. Heuer, Jr. states, “Cognitive biases 
are similar to optical illusions in that the error remains compelling even when one is fully 
aware of its nature.”59 Just as the eyes must be forced to see an optical illusion for what it 
is – an illusion, the mind (even a mind with knowledge of cognitive biases) has to be 
forced to see the biases it uses from decision to decision.  
 
Recognizing Biases 
As mentioned before, cognitive biases effects on a decision’s outcome is 
unknown. This stems from the outcome’s inherent uncertainty until the outcome has 
happened.60 In the Intelligence Community, the intelligence analyst is the person who 
most deals with the uncertainty of the world. Intelligence’s primary purpose in the 
decision-making process is to reduce uncertainty, identify risks and opportunities, and 
deepen understanding for the decision-maker.61 Though being better informed does not 
guarantee that a better decision will be made, being misinformed or uninformed reduces 
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chances for successful decision-making.62 This rule applies to everyday individuals, but 
more importantly IC analysts. The analyst must provide adequate warning, assess all key 
developments, interpret available data, and use solid assumptions to fill information gaps 
to provide decision-makers (aka, policy makers) with quality support.63 If an analyst fails 
to do so, time, effort, and a great deal of taxpayer money is wasted on a national security 
shortcoming, and the nation’s security is at risk. 
Because the brain uses System 1 and System 2 thinking, intelligence analysts 
must be aware of their own brain’s information processing as they too work to process 
information. Just like biases arise in the mind’s information processing, they also arise in 
the IC’s information processing.64 However, as previously mentioned, it is difficult to 
recognize these biases when they surface.  
Much of what this recognition difficulty derives from is called bias blind spot. 
Bias blind spot is something that all humans suffer from.65 Just as with most problems, 
people are more apt to see biases in other peoples’ judgments than their own; therefore, 
making it harder to accept their own information processing flaws.66 Though everyone 
has a bias blind spot, those with high levels of bias blind spot are least likely to recognize 
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their own biases and least likely to improve their decisions’ quality.67 This is relevant to 
individuals’ understanding of their own decision making and intelligence analysts 
looking to produce better-informed and more objective intelligence. 
There are four parallels between the brain68 and today’s intelligence analysts69 that 
will help outline exactly how biases can effect the analyst.  
 
1.   Both are exposed to information overload that each has to meticulously filter only 
keeping what is important. 
2.   Both have to form assumptions filling in information gaps to make sense of the 
evidence. 
3.   Both are required to act under a time constraint. 
4.   It is crucial that both remember the important information for future reference. 
 
Intelligence analysis is fundamentally a mental process. Information is just data 
until it is processed in the brain of an analyst; therefore, understanding how this process 
can be flawed by heuristics and biases is important to the analyst’s job.70 Each of these 
parallels between the brain and analyst are subject to their own cognitive biases. In order 
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to understand how cognitive biases affect the analyst’s information processing, one must 
understand how cognitive biases affect the decision making.  
 
Information Overload 
Essentially what is depicted as information overload is an amount of information 
(relevant, irrelevant, factual, opinionated, propaganda, evidence, etc.) that is so vast that 
it is impossible to sort through entirely to find the most important information and form a 
complete analysis under a certain time constraint. As the mind performs daily tasks under 
this condition, so do intelligence analysts. There are close similarities between the two 
operations and their environments; but as analysts work to process and analyze 
information, they, too, have their own subconscious processing and analyzing the 
information they receive.  
Now that the world is instantaneously connected through information via Internet, 
the effects of information overload have changed the way the mind processes the world.71 
As mentioned earlier, the human mind has limitations. In the case of information storage, 
that limit is three terabytes72 worth of information.73 However, the brain’s storage ability 
only amounts to one-millionth of the daily information output meaning that the 
worldwide information quantity is increasing by 2.5 quintillion bytes per day.74 Out of 
this, the amount of useful information is slight. As Nate Silver contends, “Most of it is 
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just noise, and the noise is increasing faster than the signal.”75 Because of the vast 
quantity and uncertain quality of the information that is spread daily, the brain has to use 
its space for information it deems important. 
Since the end of the Cold War, the quality and quantity of information available 
to the public and the IC has evolved.76 For the IC, the scope of information broadened 
two ways.77 One was the growing diversity of national threats.78 These threats range from 
climate change and disease to cybersecurity and terrorism.79 Not only did types of threats 
change, but the sources of threats changed from a few powerful states to billions of 
individuals residing in hundreds of nation-states.80 As Thomas Fingar explains, “the 
transition from a few countries to billions of individuals made the challenge [analysis] 
roughly a billion times more difficult.”81 The second was the overwhelming amount of 
easily accessible information that came along with technological advances.82 Since there 
are nearly billions of times more pieces of information for analysts to filter and analyze, 
analysts are experiencing information overload.83 
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To avoid information overload, intelligence analysts have to quickly filter through 
this overwhelming quantity and select the important information.84 Because the mind is 
programmed to find and respond to patterns without much hesitation, cognitive biases are 
inherent to mental processes.85 Information overload poses multiple situations in which 
biases are more likely to develop.  
In viewing a large quantity of information, the brain is likely to make 
subconscious shortcuts to narrow the scope. In one way, the brain tends to notice 
correlations between present information and information that has been recorded recently 
in memory.86 One bias responsible for this is the availability heuristic, which is the way 
the subconscious mind attaches importance to information based on how easily similar 
information is recalled.87 Another bias responsible is called base rate neglect. In this, new 
details within information become more important than the general information (even if 
the general information is more relevant).88 An additional bias involved is called the 
vividness criterion in which directly perceived information is given a greater value over 
secondhand or statistical information.89 An example encompassing these biases would be 
cancelling a flight after hearing news about two recent airplane crashes though the 
probability of a plane crash has not changed. Out of the large quantity of information 
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about airplanes and probability, the newest and most relatable information (the recent 
plane crashes) are chosen as the most important (though they are likely to be random and 
coincidental) over airplane crash statistics (the most relevant data). 
To shorten the information list, the mind often looks for changes in information. 
But once the brain finds these changes, it attaches meaning to the information based on 
the direction of the change instead of weighing the information’s new value.90 Two of 
these biases are the anchoring effect and the framing effect. The anchoring effect refers to 
the tendency to rely too heavily on the first piece of information provided and adjust 
insufficiently when provided additional information.91 This also explains the persistence 
of false impressions. Even after the first impression of information has been disproven, it 
still effects later judgments.92 The framing effect acts similarly in that the way 
information is provided often effects how it is perceived.93 For instance, saying 
something is 90% fat-free has a different effect than saying it has 10% fat. Both are 
equivalent, but the perceptions of both are disparate.  
Also, the brain tends to ignore information contrary to the expected pattern and 
only focus on what supports preconceived beliefs.94 This is best represented by the 
confirmation bias which is the tendency to perceive what is expected to be perceived in a 
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way that supports a predetermined conclusion.95 Take an analyst for example. Because 
analysts have to make assumptions and maintain expectations about people and foreign 
countries, the way they perceive information within the mounds of data depends in part 
on the analyst’s expectation patterns.96 This leads to what Richards J. Heuer, Jr. defines 
as confirmation bias, “new information [that] is typically assimilated to existing 
beliefs.”97 Simply stated, expectations influence information perception. 
 
Filling in the Gaps 
Once all the information has been reduced, the subconscious mind and analysts 
both must “connect the dots” and fill in the space between information with assumptions. 
Though there is an information abundance, to say the least, very little of that information 
is useful. This means that there lie gaps between pieces of useful information leaving 
space for analysts to fill. These information gaps are filled with assumptions linking 
information together to create a plausible narrative.98 Biases are often employed to make 
sense of information with little meaning and create an understandable sequence. 
Even in small amounts of data, patterns can be found – even patterns that are not 
really there. As a way of imposing order on a chaotic environment, the human mind 
searches for certain events’ causes even if the phenomena are accidental, coincidental, or 
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random.99 Within this are several biases relative to probability and chance. First, the 
insensitivity to sample size, or the law of small numbers, refers to the brain’s inability to 
comprehend that statistical facts do not cause an event’s occurrence, but rather change the 
outcome’s probability.100 The bottom line is large samples are more precise than small 
samples because small samples produce extreme results more often than large samples.101 
When looking at a few small pieces of data, correlations are spotted more easily than 
when the entire data set is taken into account. As a result, an analyst is more likely to say 
that data A caused data B even though their correlation is an illusion with no real 
connection. This is similar to another bias, the illusion of validity, in which the analyst is 
fully aware of their predictability limitations, but continues to hold strong confidence in a 
prediction based on a previously found pattern.102 No matter the consistency of 
information, small data amounts that cannot specifically produce a judgment must be 
held at a low confidence level.103 For example, an analyst may draw far-reaching 
inferences about a foreign government’s plans based on isolated incidents involving 
government officials who may have been acting on their own. Though it can be difficult 
to determine whether incidents are isolated or part of a broader plan, the probability of 
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isolation outweighs the assumption of a broader picture when dealing with small 
numbers. 
Gaps in information often lead the brain to associate new partial information with 
similar, previously understood information to create a coherent picture; but, once that 
information is combined, the difference between new “real” information and the “filled 
in” information is forgotten and the entire picture becomes the brain’s truth.104 
Stereotyping is the most common bias the brain uses for these situations. The 
subconscious mind uses stereotypes to categorize information.105 To do this, it holds a 
representational image of specific pieces of information and applies this image to all new 
similar information.106 Analysts may stereotype by assuming that one actor will respond a 
certain way because of their government’s regime type, or assume that an economic 
cause will have an economic effect107; both discounting other possibilities. 
Humans are biologically predisposed to assume that more favorable information 
is more valuable than unfavorable information.108 If a presented information piece’s 
quality is uncertain, the brain then creates certainty based on how favorable the 
information is to the narrative the brain is trying to create.109 In this case, the information 
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gap is filled-in with an assumption about the information’s quality.110 The halo effect is 
one bias that explains this phenomenon. Similar to the anchoring effect, the halo effect 
increases the weight of first impressions, and applies this impression to everything 
associated with the perceived information.111 From here, the opinion held about the 
information then effects how valuable the information is to the current situation and other 
instances, even if the information has nothing to do with other instances.112 An analyst 
might receive information that plays well into their intended narrative, when in actuality 
does not relate to the evidence; or, an analyst could disfavor accurate information, but 
disregard it and everything associated with it because it makes less sense of their 
narrative. 
Because the brain cannot directly communicate with another, the subconscious 
mind often assumes that the other brain (or collection of brains) is doing exactly what it is 
doing. In this case, people model others after themselves. But because people are not 
aware of everything that is happening in their own minds, a much more simplified 
version of themselves is projected onto those they are trying to understand.113 Mirror-
imaging, also known as “everybody-thinks-like-us mindset”114, is an assumption used to 
fill in gaps about another actor’s intentions, motives, or future actions.115 This means the 
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analyst might assume the other side will likely act in a way that their country would act 
under similar circumstances. This can be a dangerous assumption for analysts to make 
because different cultures have different ways and methods of thinking.116  
Another way people project is by projecting assumptions onto the past, present, or 
future. Because prediction of how fast or slow something will occur is practically 
impossible, the brain uses several biases to fill in these gaps.117 Hindsight bias is the 
number one bias when it comes to using the past and present to explain one another. In 
using this bias, people may replace their past beliefs with refurbished ones based on 
current knowledge.118 This creates a “knew-it-all-along” effect which provides ground to 
make assessments about past events based on their present outcomes.119 Like the 
hindsight bias, the narrative fallacy involves an inadequate memory of the past that 
shapes present views and expectations for the future.120 In the gambler’s fallacy, the mind 
overestimates the influence of past events on future outcomes. This means that lessons 
learned from the past are “overlearned” causing an extreme reaction in similar future 
situations.121 Using these biases, analysts may over or underestimate the quality of their 
past judgments, let these weighted judgments influence current judgments, and assume 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116	  Richards J. Heuer, Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, Central Intelligence 
Agency: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999, Print, Pg. 70, www.odci.gov/csi.	  
117	  Buster Benson, “Cognitive bias cheat sheet,” Better Humans, September 1, 2016, 
https://betterhumans.coach.me/cognitive-bias-cheat-sheet-55a472476b18#.mq1uu92qp.	  
118	  Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, New York: 
2011, Print, Pg. 202-204.	  
119	  Ibid.	  
120	  Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, New York: 
2011, Print, Pg. 199.	  
121	  Robert Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails: lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the 
Iraq War, Cornell University Press, Ithaca: 2010, Print, Pg. 138-139. 
	   27	  
that these same events will have direct effects on the future.122 Though assumptions are 
necessary to fill information gaps, these assumptions must be heavily scrutinized before 
they are allowed to stand on their own. 
 
Time Constraint 
For analysts and the subconscious mind to produce an analysis as closely 
representing reality as possible, the information scope must be narrowed and information 
gaps must be filled with solid assumptions. However, these tasks take place under a time 
constraint. In the IC, intelligence is a product analysts tailor to meet the needs and 
timelines of the decision-maker.123 Decision-makers expect analysts to alert them of 
changes and developments, and always want to know more about what to expect moving 
forward.124 As new developments and changes emerge, analysts attempt to examine 
available relevant factors and interpret the information’s meaning within the real-world 
decision timelines of U.S. policymakers; but producing a perfect analysis is not as 
important as providing helpful insights in a timely manner.125 Even if providing a perfect 
analysis was possible, the final product would not contribute to national security because, 
by the time it would be produced, its utility timeline would have expired.126 Because 
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there is little time to waste, analyses involve drawing conclusions.127 These conclusions 
are based on limited evidence which is the best the human mind can do for a time-limited 
decision-making process.128 Along with these conclusions come inherent biases. 
In order to act under time pressure, most people want to feel confident in their 
ability to impact the situation at hand.129 However, several biases grow from this 
confidence. Overconfidence is the primary bias that can result from a simple desire for 
importance. Most of the confidence people hold in their beliefs depend on their 
narrative’s coherence created out of limited evidence. With overconfidence, coherence 
develops out of a perceived pattern in the evidence and rejects the possibility of missing 
evidence critical to developing the “true” representation of reality.130 To make 
information processing quicker, analysts either reject or accept present evidence. If 
rejected, the evidence is rejected completely and is no longer used. If accepted, the 
evidence is accepted completely and any probability of its inaccuracy is ignored.131 
Overconfidence simplifies probability and ignores uncertainty.132 For instance, analysts’ 
judgments based on evidence treated as 100 percent certain, when in reality the analyst is 
only 80 percent certain, are overconfident.  
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Aside from being personally important, people also want their work to be 
important. Because people do not want to admit they have wasted their constrained time, 
they are usually motivated to complete only the tasks they have invested the most time 
to.133 Out of this arises several biases. One bias is loss aversion, which is the tendency for 
people to prefer the absence of gains to losses. This bias indicates that people suffer more 
when they lose than when they fail to gain.134 Applied to analysis, an analyst likely would 
rather fail to gain time for relevant work than lose time because of wasted work. Another 
bias is the endowment effect, which is the tendency for people to hold more value to a 
possession simply because they own it.135 As analysts are critical for providing 
intelligence to decision-makers, they have to relinquish the ownership of their 
intelligence products to the policymaker to implement the new idea. This would not be a 
problem for most people except that policymakers rarely share credit for the intelligence 
with the analyst responsible.136 This means the analyst’s only incentive for giving up their 
product is the possible successful outcome of a policymaker’s decision. 
When people are to choose between options, they normally choose the option 
with the least amount of risk involved as to conserve time by avoiding irreversible 
decisions. This plays into the understanding that people will work harder to avoid losses 
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then to achieve gains.137 The bias best representing this is the status quo bias. This is the 
idea that the current state is better than an uncertain alternative state. The status quo bias 
influences people to conserve the status quo and avoid changes as much as possible.138 
When conservation becomes one’s mindset, they become resistant to change.139 For an 
analyst, this bias becomes a problem when they disregard changes or abnormal 
information simply because changing the status quo is too time consuming or would 
cause them to reconsider a long-time, developing analysis. This can also be problematic 
when the analyst views a foreign country through a status quo lens and does not account 
for abnormal changes within the foreign government’s or society’s behavior. 
 
What to Remember 
After analysis is concluded and intelligence is produced to the decision-maker 
(whether that be policymakers or the conscious mind), the analyst and subconscious mind 
have to decide what information to store for future reference. In the human brain, a few 
key items are chosen to save and all the other intricate details are discarded.140 The 
information that is saved comes back to later play a part in filtering the information 
overload and filling in information gaps.141 But because the brain has limited space, it can 
only take in limited information. 
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When intricate details are discarded, a few things happen to the saved 
information. First, some information gets edited or reinforced.142 Some memories can 
become stronger, later over-powering other new but important information. Some details 
within the information can get disfigured and replaced with other already stored details. 
Second, information specifics may turn into generalities.143 Third, information about 
entire events or lists are reduced to a few points representing the whole.144 Finally, 
information can be stored based on the circumstances in which the information was 
received, even if it had little or nothing to do with the information.145 Each of these 
storing methods serves as grounds for later bias. 
Understanding how the brain stores information and the biases that are at risk can 
later help recognize when biases are at play and guard against them when noticed. 
However, it is too easy to say that if analysts would just recognize biases, then they 
would not be biased. Analysis is ultimately a mental process. Because biases are at the 
root of the mental process, biases are highly resistant to efforts to guard against them.146 
There are ways analysts can improve their analysis by changing the way they think about 
defining the problem, forming and evaluating hypotheses, and monitoring new 
information.147 
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When defining the problem in need of analysis, the analyst must ask the right 
questions.148 There is a large difference in questions types – there are the right questions 
and the easier questions to answer.149 One of the subconscious mind’s tendencies is to 
substitute the right question with an easier question to answer if the answer to the right 
question is not found quickly.150  For instance, an analyst might need to answer “What 
will the relationship between State A and State B be like six months from now?” The 
easier counterpart to this would be “What is the relationship between State A and State B 
like right now?” Though the easier question’s answer may be part of answering the right 
question, it is not the answer to both. Easier questions open the analyst up to a greater 
chance of succumbing to biases. The analyst may not realize they are answering the right 
question with an easier question’s answer. A sign that the right question has been 
replaced by an easier one includes coming to a conclusion almost at an instant without 
much conscious thought, if any.151  
Forming and evaluating hypotheses is subject to its own bias possibilities, but also 
has its own defense techniques. To generate hypotheses, the analyst considers and lists all 
likely outcomes.152 At this point, the mind generally wants to consider only those that it 
conceives as most probable, but not all those that are likely possible. This can be solved 
in part by using a brainstorming method and consulting other experts, while withholding 
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all judgment until every hypothesis is listed. To evaluate hypotheses, the analyst can 
scrutinize each hypothesis attempting to prove each one wrong with the available 
evidence. Evidence is used to argue against each hypothesis rather than used to confirm 
one. Finally, the most likely hypothesis is the one left with the least amount of evidence 
against it.153 It is important to note that one hypothesis should be kept pointing out the 
possibility that the adversary is using denial and deception to influence U.S. perceptions 
and actions. This hypothesis should not be rejected until there is substantial evidence 
against this possibility.154 
Because the information pool expands dramatically every day, it is likely that 
analytical conclusions will be altered or proven wrong.155 This means that as the analyst 
receives new information, keeping an open mind and accepting their analyses tentative 
nature is critical to accurately adapting their understanding of the world.156 Whenever 
surprising information arises, consider that this information may be compatible with an 
alternative hypothesis that may have been rejected in hypotheses evaluation.157 All things 
considered, as analysts attempt to form useful analyses with constantly increasing yet 
incomplete information on a strict timeline, biases are present and resilient, but can be 
guarded against.
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Part III: Reflexive Control and the United States 
 
Several biases seem to have played a role in the United States’ concept 
development of what reflexive control is and looks like in today’s hybrid warfare age. 
This dilemma is an appropriate concern for the U.S. Intelligence Community as it deals 
with the nation’s security and information warfare. 
Ultimately, U.S. policymakers make the responsive decisions addressing reflexive 
control; however, analysts take part in informing these policymakers.158 If well-informed 
decisions are to be made in response to Russian actions, then the analyst must attempt to 
increase the policymaker’s understanding and reduce their uncertainty about reflexive 
control. While informing the policymaker on the facts and introducing an analysis, the 
analyst may also share the potential for probable biases regarding the matter at hand.  
Recognizing these biases can be difficult.159 The analyst’s information 
environment consists of various sources, each having their own potential for bias.160 The 
analyst’s minimal control over the information presented to them is an obstacle in itself, 
but having various information sources that are often incomplete and conflict with on
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another further complicates the analyst’s judgments, especially when the analyst is under 
a time constraint to provide the policymaker with their analysis.161  
Because everyone is different, each person has their own set of intelligence, concepts, 
knowledge, ideas, and experiences. Therefore, everyone reacts to information differently. 
Some people react using different biases while others react without using biases at all.162 
As previously mentioned, biases are not always wrong. They are tools the brain uses to 
counteract the pressure of decision making under undesirable circumstances, like having 
too much useless information leaving gaps between important information and not having 
enough time to properly sort it all out.163 This can be helpful, but the biases that 
participate in this process need to be identified and monitored when good judgment is 
imperative.  
 
Overarching Biases 
Once the brain establishes a perspective, it will adapt new information to this 
perspective. Thus, new information is accepted or rejected depending on its consistency 
with the established perspective.164 Alterations to established perspectives are slow to
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occur.165 Ideally, analysts and policymakers would be open to information pointing to 
alternate perspectives, but the brain does not biologically function that way.166 In other 
words, people’s decisions rely more on perspective than on evidence. 
Biases that shape these perspectives have a great potential to impact the United 
States’ responses to Russian reflexive control. Though many of these biases can 
specifically effect U.S. reactions, several extend over all and play a role in more 
subjective circumstances. These include, the availability heuristic, vividness criterion, 
confirmation bias, illusion of validity, stereotyping, overconfidence, and loss aversion. 
In relation to the availability heuristic and reflexive control, analysts and 
policymakers may rely on knowledge about Soviet disinformation tactics to make 
judgments on Russian disinformation. Because the Cold War holds the most memorable 
examples of reflexive control and disinformation, these instances and past judgments may 
still be readily available in analysts’ or policymakers’ minds. When the availability 
heuristic is used, these memories are used as the basis for current and future judgments. 
However, the Soviet Union used disinformation to achieve a different set of goals than 
Russia currently uses disinformation to achieve.  As these goals are different, Russia’s 
disinformation is used differently than the Soviet Union by provoking a different 
response from adversaries to achieve their goals. Basing perception about current Russian 
disinformation on Soviet disinformation is counterproductive as it enables Russia to act 
in today’s world while U.S. policymakers respond to a memory decades old.  
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Analysts typically work with secondhand information coming from other eyes and 
ears rather than experiencing the information for themselves.167 However, when an 
analyst experiences information firsthand, it can have more influence on evaluations and 
decisions even if the information is not as important as other secondhand information.168 
This is called the vividness criterion. For instance, if an analyst or policymaker dealing 
with Russian reflexive control has traveled to Russia or spoken directly to a Russian 
government official, their perspective on Russian reflexive control may be altered. If a 
policymaker spoke directly to a Russian official, like Russian Ambassador Sergey 
Kislyak, their perception of the Russian government’s goals and intentions may be 
tainted with an idea of the person they are familiar with.  
In general, confirmation bias occurs through the patterns an analyst or 
policymaker expects in the mounds of information they receive on particular topic.169 
Both of these actors have expectations for the motives and processes of specific people 
and foreign governments.170 Information consistent with these preconceptions are easy to 
add to the analysis, while contradictory information is not. This becomes a problem when 
System 1 applies the confirmation bias and the contradictory information is ignored or 
distorted. As mentioned before and further discussed later, reflexive control primarily 
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uses disinformation in pursuit of Russia’s goals.171 Confirmation bias can be dangerous in 
this case because disinformation can be spread to reinforce false beliefs, while making it 
easier to dismiss accurate information. 
Another way biases shape the United States’ reflexive control perspective is by 
assuming Russia’s actions that are similar in execution have the same purpose. A 
previously observed pattern draws connections between the same pattern and new 
information to maintain consistency; however, this can be deceptive.172 The illusion of 
validity can lead an analyst or a policymaker to believe that everything Russia does is 
connected and designed for the same purpose. This is even made worse when one does 
not understand Russian objectives. Stereotyping leads to assuming that just because 
Russia is involved in something or some place, then a certain element of a perceived 
Russian objective is involved as well. 
When evaluating evidence, analysts hold confidence levels in the validity and 
reliability of the evidence and their own judgments.173 In this manner, analysts are not 
typically susceptible to overconfidence in information, but rather in their analyses.174 
This may prevent the analyst from accurately applying new information to an alternate 
view of their analysis because of their mental tie to their pre-existing judgment. 
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Because perspective alters slowly, letting go of integrated information that is later 
proven false is difficult.175 This explains how loss aversion effects analysts and 
policymakers’ responses to events. Since disinformation is such a large part of reflexive 
control, analysts and policymakers must be able to disregard false information they once 
thought was true. Otherwise, they may make judgments that undermine effective 
responses to reflexive control.  
The brain’s formed perspective is primarily responsible for a person’s judgments 
and decisions. Aside from the previously mentioned biases that extend over a large range 
of situations, other biases can be seen in the way the West understands Russian reflexive 
control and has reacted to the technique in specific instances. In the following sections, 
these instances will be further explained, and Western literature on Russian reflexive 
control will be examined. 
 
Specifics and Generalities 
One way biases have hindered the West’s understanding of Russian reflexive 
control is that too much emphasis has been placed on specifics and not enough on the 
general details or big picture.  
Russia’s military development not only relies on industrial and infrastructural 
improvements, but also innovation in military thought.176 Military thought is the manner 
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in which the Russian military assesses the current war environment and projects an idea 
of the future war environment. Timothy Thomas states, “These developments and 
thought processes need to be studied and digested by Western analysts so that they can 
offer US decision-makers their best estimate of the character of Russia’s future war 
thought, the direction in which Russia’s military appears to be heading, and, thus, the 
types of actions that could either support or deter Russian plans.”177 To broaden the focus 
of U.S. officials, analysts and policymakers must understand the effect that base rate 
neglect has on their judgment. 
Base rate neglect has influenced U.S. officials to focus more on hybrid actions, 
tactics, and techniques rather than on the underlying methods and forms of military 
thought. Forms are the organizational constructs of military thought, while methods 
consist of available weapons and military doctrine. Timothy Thomas also concludes that 
the forms and methods of Russian military thought are “often ignored in the West, 
perhaps because they appear almost neutral or vanilla in meaning.”178 Whatever the 
reason they are disregarded, the two concepts are vital to understanding how Russia uses 
the shift in war from a contemporary to hybrid nature.179 
While Russian reflexive control originated in the Soviet Union, Russia’s military 
thought has developed persistently since the end of the Cold War.180 Therefore, Russian 
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and Soviet reflexive control are disparate because of the underlying military thought that 
developed them. Western literature portrays reflexive control by evaluating specific 
instances of hybrid actions, as seen in Ukraine, and comparing them to Soviet tactics. By 
using these specifics to assess reflexive control, the West inadequately responds to 
Russian disinformation and misunderstands Russian objectives.181 
The law of small numbers is another bias effecting the U.S. perspective on 
reflexive control. Similar to the narrative fallacy, later discussed in this part, the law of 
small numbers leads U.S. officials to use a few events involving Russian reflexive control 
or Russian reflexive control in one area of the world to create a narrative answering 
questions like what reflexive control is, how Russia uses reflexive control, and what 
Russian intentions are. Western analysts have written assessments of reflexive control 
based on Russia’s involvement in Eastern Europe, specifically Ukraine and Crimea. Most 
Western literature uses these cases to define and predict Russian actions.182 Though these 
are leading examples of present day reflexive control, they are too concentrated to one 
region as Russia’s goals in Eastern Europe are different from their goals in other regions 
of the world.183  
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Disinformation, Framing, and Anchoring 
Currently, Russia uses offensive and defensive disinformation as part of its 
reflexive control campaign.184 Russia’s disinformation seems to be most useful when it 
has an anchoring effect or framing effect on the adversary. In terms of the anchoring 
effect, it is the bias that hooks or primes the decision-maker and guides them to make the 
decision Russia intends for them to make. Similarly, the framing effect depends on the 
way disinformation is presented to the adversary thus encouraging a Russian-crafted 
perspective.  
When a Russian official makes a statement, U.S. analysts have to decide if the 
statement is directed domestically or internationally, and if it is truthful or designed to 
deceive foreign policymakers. These decisions are made with the understanding that 
Russia is an independent, uncontrollable entity with the potential to manipulate the 
United States; however, the impact disinformation has on the analyst is not reduced.185 
As Russian officials make disinformation effortless for System 1 to process, the analyst’s 
brain involuntarily accepts the information making analysis more difficult as more 
assumptions are formed and must be assessed. 
In past and recent instances regarding the United States and Russia, the anchoring 
effect and framing effect have been present. The most commonly used past example is 
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Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the effect Russia’s initial statements had on NATO 
leaders.  Though NATO possessed enough evidence that supported the events’ true 
nature, Russia used several of the D’s in the reflexive control 4D approach to thwart a 
timely NATO response. Russia’s repeated denial of their involvement in Ukraine, the 
distortion of facts about Russian soldiers (blame placed on rogue soldiers) and Russia’s 
nonexistent war declaration delayed NATO’s response because of uncertainty and the 
lasting effect of Russia’s influential disinformation.186 In this case, the way Russia 
framed its information effected NATO’s response though they were aware of the existing 
contrary evidence. 
One recent example is the way Russia has used anchoring to frame the Western 
approach to democracy as unstable and corrupt. During the 2016 U.S. presidential 
election, a Russian government-linked cyber hacking group attacked the Democratic 
National Committee and leaked information to WikiLeaks that revealed the rigged 
selection of the Democratic Party’s presidential candidate, Hillary Clinton.187 This 
instance is an example of Russia’s attempt to reveal corruption is the U.S. democratic 
election system – the foundation of modern Western democracy.  
Russia has framed Western governments as corrupt in the public’s perception. 
Now, the public is anchored on this perception and view it as fact. From this point 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186	  Maria Snegovaya, “Putin’s Information Warfare in Ukraine: Soviet Origins of 
Russia’s Hybrid Warfare,” (Russia Report 1, Institute for the Study of War, September 
2015), http://understandingwar.org/report/putins-information-warfare-ukraine-soviet-
origins-russias-hybrid-warfare.	  
187	  Dmitri Trenin, “Information is a potent weapon in the new cold war,” The Guardian, 
September 17, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/sep/17/hacking-
politics-us-russia.	  
	   44	  
forward, it is likely that any issue with democratic elections or Western governments will 
encourage the public to question the validity of the democratic government system.  
 
Past v. Present and Future 
Using the past as the framework for the present and future narrows the scope of 
probabilities for analysts and policymakers to consider. In return, Russia’s opportunities 
to use reflexive control are broadened. Four biases, in particular, seem to have attributed 
to this and are exhibited in much of the Western literature on Russian reflexive control. 
These include the halo effect, hindsight bias, narrative fallacy, and gambler’s fallacy.  
According to Richards J. Heuer, Jr., “the use of [narrative] coherence rather than 
scientific observation as the criterion for judging truth leads to biases that presumably 
influence all analysts to some degree.”188 Narrative coherence may be formed based on 
an analyst’s partiality to a certain explanation based on subjective reasons.189 For 
example, literature on reflexive control exhibits the halo effect as many analysts place a 
large emphasis on Putin’s KGB background to support the claim that Russian reflexive 
control is the same as Soviet reflexive control.190 In all actuality, this only explains why 
reflexive control was chosen as a tactic, not how or for what reasons Russia uses 
reflexive control.  
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Also, many analysts have given Russia’s 2014 involvement in Crimea and 
Ukraine a halo effect by using it as a catch-all explanation for reflexive control. Though 
these instances are prime examples of Russian reflexive control and exemplify much of 
Russia’s hybrid warfare doctrine,191 too much focus on these specific instances may lead 
analysts and policymakers to compare them to current and future instances. Though these 
instances provide valuable incite into Russian reflexive control, reflexive control can be 
used in many other ways (not used in Ukraine or Crimea) and in other parts of the world.  
As in Ukraine and Crimea, Russia is likely attempting to slowly integrate other 
former Soviet states, like Ukraine and Crimea, into its sphere of influence.192 Jeffrey 
Mankoff, deputy director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies  stated that Russia’s grand strategy is “based on rolling back the 
spread of Western values and institutions… and establishing a sort of Russian world, at 
least in the areas around Russian borders.”193 This is a probable explanation for Russia’s 
actions in the region. However, it is highly doubtful that Russia is attempting to influence 
the United States the way it means to influence Ukraine, which means Russia’s interests 
and goals it has for the United States are different. If current and future instances are 
placed in the Ukraine-Crimea framework, then analysts and policymakers may ignore 
important information that does not fit the mold.  
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In light of hindsight bias, the Western perspective of Soviet reflexive control and 
past Russian actions seem to become further shaped as the West is more exposed to 
reflexive control in Russia’s current actions. The gap between the two concepts shrinks 
smaller and smaller with every new action Russia takes. This has led to the blurred line 
between Soviet and Russian reflexive control in current literature. Also including the 
gambler’s fallacy, some literature references Soviet reflexive control, compare it to 
Russian reflexive control, and assume it should have the same elements. With this 
assumption, it is hinted that current and future reflexive control actions should be 
predictable because of the United States’ experience with Soviet reflexive control.  
For example, a former consultant at the Institute for the Study of War, Maria 
Snegovaya states, “…Russia’s ‘newly’ launched information war is no different from the 
disinformation instruments that were widely used by the Soviets against the West in the 
second half of 20th century.” Snegovaya continues to say, “…basic analysis reveals that 
all of the main principles and approaches the Russian government utilizes today were 
taken from Soviet toolkits.”194 Though it is true that Soviet and Russian reflexive control 
share basic similarities, the eras in which these have been used are completely different. 
As these techniques look equal at face value, Russia uses reflexive control in different 
ways and often times for different goals than the Soviets.195 If analysts view reflexive 
control as a Soviet tool, then they likely will be blind to Russian innovation making it 
easier for Russia to use reflexive control. 
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Another bias present in Western literature is the narrative fallacy. This bias takes 
Russia’s past actions and applies it to present and future expectations of Russian actions; 
however, Russia’s plans for action change as the adversary adjusts to Russia’s apparent 
strategy. According to Timothy Thomas, Russia has goals in place, but not an 
overarching plan for reaching them. Though more structured than a play-by-ear strategy, 
Russia’s agenda adjusts consistently with the adversary’s social, political, and 
psychological changes. Russian General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov explains, “each 
situation has a logic on its own.” At each stage of an action, Russia re-evaluates their 
adversary and the developing situation to decide their next step in achieving their end 
goal.196 Contrary to much of the literature using past Russian acts as reflexive control 
examples, Russian involvement in Crimea, Ukraine, Estonia, and Georgia each had their 
own specific needs for Russia to achieve their goals. For example, cyber actions were all 
that was needed for Estonia, while cyber as well as direct action was needed for Georgia. 
Direct force was needed in Crimea, while surrogate support in the form of indirect force 
was needed in Eastern Ukraine.197 Each of these instances included reflexive control, but 
each differed from the other in form or method.  
The instances mentioned above only account for the area surrounding Western 
Russia. The change in form and method would probably be different for the United States 
and other areas of the world. Therefore, an understanding of the forms and methods 
underlying these tactics would better prepare the United States for how Russia might use 
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reflexive control in different regions.198 This is not so much a problem with intelligence 
analysts as it is with analysts publishing literature on reflexive control while not 
understanding the basic forms and methods that shape this warfare. If policymakers rely 
more on these kinds of analyses that use face-value information rather than analyses that 
take Russia’s guiding principles into account, then policymakers will likely be misguided 
into reacting to reflexive control the way Russia expects and desires. 
 
Russia and the West 
At last, there are a few biases that stem from the United States specifically. The 
failure to understand Russia’s national interests may cause U.S. officials to assume they 
share the same perspective as Russian officials.199 Mirror-imaging is one bias that leads 
the U.S. analyst or policymaker to assume Russia’s self-interest pushes them to act in a 
way the United States would. This is dangerous because people in the Russian 
government do not think exactly like people in the U.S. government.200  
 However, Russia might be falling to mirror-imaging. Russia is likely attempting 
to create unstable conditions in the United States and West that mimic Russia’s societal 
issues. For instance, Russia’s 2016 parliamentary elections, which occurred on 
September 18, held the lowest voter turnout since the Soviet Union collapse.201 Former 
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Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, along with other Russian officials, blames the 
low turnout on a national loss-of-faith in the Russian voting system.202 Loss of public 
faith in the domestic political system is what led to the Soviet demise.203 Probably 
Russia’s intention, U.S. citizens and policymakers fear Russian election manipulation 
forming a similar loss-of-faith in the 2016 presidential election outcome.204 
 Russia’s societal issues also include a major division between their population 
due to an enormous income gap. Most of Russia’s wealth is concentrated in only 10 of 
the country’s 85 regions with the median income falling close to the poorest 10% of 
regions.205 As the income gap has grown and the cost of living has risen, Russian 
citizen’s dissatisfaction has led to an increase in non-political protests. This is a major 
focus for the Russian government as they act to contain dissatisfaction by focusing 
domestic attention on propaganda blaming the West for Russia’s economic strife.206  
 The Russian government has been actively supporting extreme political parties on 
the far-left and far-right in Western countries in the 2016/2017 elections.207 These parties 
help Russia spread their propaganda among the Western public, and Russia provides the 
groups with financial and diplomatic support.208 For example, Marine Le Pen, leader of 
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National Front in France received a 9-million-euro loan from Moscow in 2014 after 
expressing during the Crimea crisis that National Front and Russia “defend common 
values”, and in 2016 asked Russia for a 27-million-euro loan as the elections in France 
are approaching.209 In Germany, Russia has two parties in the 2017 election: both the far-
right, Alternative fur Deutschland, and far-left, Die Linke.210 Russia’s intention is likely 
to influence these governments for a more pro-Russian attitude within the Western 
countries causing division in domestic politics and Western institutions, like NATO.211 
 If Russia is acting under mirror-imaging, what Russia may not be taking into 
account is the United States’ long history of functioning under societal and political 
division.212 Understanding this possible flaw in Russian decision making could give the 
United States an edge over Russia in the information warfare age. 
Another bias is the endowment effect that encourages the analyst or policymaker 
to underestimate Russia’s capabilities because of an overestimation or glamorization of 
U.S. abilities. For example, it may be expected that Russian hackers would attempt to 
destabilize trust in the U.S. election. One possible reason for this is that U.S. citizens hold 
so much value to the U.S. system and U.S. capabilities that they assume no one would 
ever attack it. In this case, they may have overestimated the value of the U.S. system and 
its value to other countries in part because it is their system. They overvalue the U.S. 
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system to the point they thought it was too valuable to everyone to be in danger of 
destabilization attempts. This is a way the endowment effect influences U.S. perspective 
on Russian reflexive control. 
Perspective is quick to form and resistant to change.213 The United States’ 
rejection of change displays the status quo bias which leads U.S. policymakers to make 
decisions based on the assumption that things will remain the same. More outlets for 
reflexive control disinformation exists today than in the Cold War, which means the 
United States must be prepared for changes in Russian tactics. Though reflexive control 
is far from being a new concept, significant changes have been made to Russian 
counterintelligence techniques since the Soviet days.214    
As shown in recent Russian actions against the West and the United States, one of 
Russia’s goals is likely to weaken the West by dividing the NATO member states, and 
destabilize the image of the West (specifically democracies) to the rest of world 
(especially the developing world).215 Several analysts warn about the new world order on 
the rise.216 Or, as Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov calls it, the “post-West world 
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order.”217 It may be difficult for U.S. policymakers to picture the world differently and 
recognize the potential for the status quo to be threatened and to change. The status quo 
bias creates the inability of Western officials to accept the possibility that the current 
world order could change or is changing. Also, it inhibits adjustment to think according 
to these changes.  
Different than Soviet reflexive control, today’s Russian reflexive control uses 
disinformation to destroy pieces of the adversary’s infrastructure.218 One of Russia’s 
interests involves changing the current world order.219 To do this, Russia aims to discredit 
the West and cause domestic unrest in the European Union and NATO states to divide 
Western international institutions.220 To discredit the West, Russia is likely working to 
expose corruption and sowing distrust within the public-government-media triad to 
undermine the core of Western democracy.  
One example of Russia’s attempt to disrupt this triad is through the term, “fake 
news”. Russian Kremlin-backed propaganda outlet, Russia Today (RT), launched its own 
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website called FakeCheck to “distinguish between what is real and what is fake news.”221 
For instance, the site is “investigating” whether or not the CIA developed and spread 
Ebola and the U.S. government planned the 9/11 terrorist attacks.222  
This is a threat to democracy as this term’s use attempts to undermine the 
credibility of the main democratic institution meant to hold the government 
accountable.223 President Trump has repeatedly banned journalists from the White House 
under the accusation that their reports are “fake news”.224 If the government does not 
inform the media, then the media cannot do their job properly and inform the public. 
When the government encourages the public to distrust the media, then the public will 
not believe the media even if the news is the truth. In the end, the public is unaware of the 
government’s actions and their effects on the public’s livelihood. This gives the 
government incentive to disregard voter opinion as voters will not be informed anyway. 
In the end, all three parts of the triad distrust one another creating an unstable more 
polarized national system225. Biases such as mirror-imaging, the endowment effect, and 
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the status-quo bias may hinder the West’s ability to accurately assess Russia’s 
capabilities against the West. 
In order to understand a technique aimed at decision-making, like reflexive 
control, understanding how decisions are made and the flaws in the process is essential. 
Though these are just a few of the immediate biases one can point out from Western 
literature and examples of U.S-Russian relations, understanding them can increase the 
quality of U.S. decision-making. Recognizing U.S. cognitive biases is the first step to 
combating Russian reflexive control. 
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Conclusion 
This paper set out to answer the question: do cognitive biases make the United 
States vulnerable to Russia’s use of reflexive control? Though very few pieces of 
literature connect cognitive biases and reflexive control, the literature on cognitive biases 
focuses on flawed decision-making, while the literature on reflexive control focuses on 
its manipulation of flaws within the adversary’s decision-making process. Therefore, 
cognitive biases should make any country or individual’s decision-making process 
vulnerable to reflexive control. After exploring previous analysis and observations on 
both reflexive control and cognitive biases, the concluding answer was found to be yes. 
Cognitive biases weaken the decision-making process making it reflexive control easier 
to use and more effective. 
This paper’s conclusion creates its own place among the literature on reflexive 
control as it connects the field of psychology and demonstrates how this field is critical to 
understanding the use and effects of reflexive control. As mentioned in Part III, cognitive 
biases and their effects on judgment and decision-making explains certain instances with 
U.S.-Russian relations. Cognitive biases are recognizable when observing the West and 
the United States’ reactions to Russia’s use of reflexive control. If the United States 
becomes more proactive in recognizing and combating cognitive biases, then the United 
States will be better defended against Russian reflexive control. 
Findings in observing U.S.-Russian relations indicate that cognitive biases can 
explain how Russian reflexive control is an efficient strategy against the United States. 
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However, there remain some avenues for further research on the connection between 
cognitive biases and reflexive control. For instance, are certain cognitive biases more or 
less detectable than others? Identifying differences, such as detectability, between biases 
could clarify the challenges they pose individually.  
Research and observations support the claim that cognitive biases make the 
United States vulnerable to reflexive control. However, further research is needed on the 
connection between these topics. Though understanding and recognizing cognitive biases 
could aid in guarding against reflexive control, more questions must be answered to fully 
protect the United States and the U.S. decision-making process from Russian reflexive 
control. 
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